

Chaos Engineering for Serverless Architectures

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Outline

- Common Faults
- Fault Injection Techniques
 - Source Code
 - Environment
 - Network
 - Configuration
- Demonstration



The Nature of Failure and its simulation



Common Faults

Resource Exhaustion

- CPU Stress
- Memory
- Disk Space
- Disk Bandwidth

Network Dependency Disruption

- Latency
- Bandwidth
- Packet loss
- Failure to connect
- 4XX / 5XX HTTP Response

Not all failures are binary



Fault Injection Types

Code Manipulation

Environment Manipulation

Network Manipulation



Application

Compute Environment

Network



Fault Injection Techniques

	Code Manipulation	Environment Manipulation	Network Manipulation
COTS on EC2	No	Yes	Yes
COTS on Serverless	No	No	No
Application on EC2	Yes	Yes	Yes
Application on Serverless	Yes	No	Yes



Fault Injection Techniques

	Code Manipulation	Environment Manipulation	Network Manipulation
COTS on EC2	No	Yes	Yes
COTS on Serverless	No	No	No
Application on EC2	Yes	Yes	Yes
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Fault Injection Techniques

	Code Manipulation	Environment Manipulation	Network Manipulation
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COTS on Serverless	No	No	No
Application on EC2	Yes	Yes	Yes
Application on Serverless	Yes	No	Yes

Source Code Manipulation

Common Faults

- 4XX / 5XX API Responses
- Disk exhaustion
- Message corruption
- Network Latency

- AWS Java SDK Request Handlers
- Failure Lambda
- AWS Lambda Chaos Injection



Environment Manipulation

Common Faults

- CPU Stress
- Memory exhaustion
- Open file exhaustion
- Disk space exhaustion
- Disk Bandwidth throttling
- Network throttling

- Stress-NG
- fallocate / dd
- Traffic Control
- CPUStres
- TestLimit



Network Manipulation

Common Faults

- TCP Packet Loss
- Bandwidth Limitation
- Network Latency
- No Connectivity

- Security Groups
- Network Access Control Lists
- Network Firewall
- HTTP Proxy
- NAT Instance



Configuration Manipulation

Common Faults


- SQS cannot call AWS Lambda
- Kinesis is not able to fulfill a request from CloudWatch

- Resource Policies
- IAM Policies
- VPC Attachment




Time to Experiment








Convert JSON to CSV






- Convert JSON to CSV
- JSON Objects written to Chaos-Bucket






- Convert JSON to CSV
- JSON Objects written to Chaos-Bucket
- Notifications sent via SQS






- Convert JSON to CSV
- JSON Objects written to Chaos-Bucket
- Notifications sent via SQS
- Converted CSV Objects written to Chaos-Bucket






- Convert JSON to CSV
- JSON Objects written to Chaos-Bucket
- Notifications sent via SQS
- Converted CSV Objects
 written to Chaos-Bucket
- Transform recorded to DynamoDB





- Convert JSON to CSV
- JSON Objects written to Chaos-Bucket
- Notifications sent via SQS
- Converted CSV Objects written to Chaos-Bucket
- Transform recorded to DynamoDB
- Notifications sent via SNS





Service Health Measurements

Service Level Indicators

Service Level Objectives

% of messages currently being processed

No more than 80% of messages should be in flight


% of messages that have been processed

Between 90 and 100% of messages have been processed


% of messages that could not be processed

No more than 5% of messages failed processing


























Experiment 1 – Configuration Manipulation



Serverless Manipulation Experiment

Hypothesis	When SQS invocation of Lambda is disrupted the SLO for messages in flight will not be exceeded.
Fault Simulated	Disruption of Lambda control plane
Service Level Indicators	• % messages in flight, SLO (< 80%)
Method	 Place system under steady load of 120 documents per minute Set Reserved Concurrency for data processing Lambda function to 0 Observe system for 5 minutes Reset Reserved Concurrency limit Wait for steady state to return



DEMONSTRATION



Experiment 2 – Source Code Manipulation



Source Code Manipulation Experiment

Hypothesis	Denying 50% of the requests to DynamoDB will not cause the system to drop below 90% successful processing rate.
Fault Simulated	Network disruption between Lambda and DynamodDB
Service Level Indicators	 % messages complete, SLO (90% < 100%)
Method	 Have failure-lambda library embedded in Lambda function Apply a steady state load of 120 files per minute Set Parameter Store parameter to configure denying DynamoDB access from 50% of Lambda invocations Observe system for 5 minutes Reset Parameter Store parameter Wait for steady state to return

DEMONSTRATION




Experiment 3 – Network Manipulation



Network Architecture

- Bind Serverless services to VPC
- Use routing tables to direct traffic to a NAT instance
- NAT instance using iptables, tc, and HTTP proxy
- Iptables directs HTTP traffic to the HTTP proxy
- Iptables enables masquerading
- tc (Traffic Control) throttles / delays / loses TCP packets





Network Manipulation Experiment

Hypothesis	The service will keep % complete above 90% when up to 70% of TCP packet to DynamoDB are lost from Availability Zone A.	ets
Fault Simulated	Network disruption between Lambda and DynamoDB	
Service Level Indicators	 % messages complete(90% < 100%) 	
Method	 Bind the Lambda function to Availability Zone A Deploy a NAT instance with a transparent proxy to filter traffic for DynamoDB Use a route table to direct requests for DynamoDB through the NAT instance Place the system under steady load of 120 files per minute Use Traffic Control (tc) to cause 70% packet loss for traffic to DynamoDB Observe system for 5 minutes Clear packet loss for traffic to DynamoDB 	
	8. Wait for steady state to be achieved	35

DEMONSTRATION



Recap

Common Faults

Fault Injection Techniques

- Source Code Manipulation
- Environment Manipulation
- Network Manipulation
- Configuration Manipulation

Demonstration

Available Tools

- NAT instance / network proxy
 - Traffic Control
 - HTTP Proxy
- Failure Lambda library
- AWS Lambda Chaos Injection Library
- Service configuration



Further Reading

Paper: Building Mission Critical Financial Services Applications on AWS

Blog post: Failure Modes and Continuous Resilience medium.com/@adrianco

Blog post: Towards Continuous Resilience medium.com/@adhorn

Workshop: Resilience Engineering Workshop resilience.workshop.aws

Workshop: Well Architected Labs – Reliability wellarchitectedlabs.com/reliability





Thank you!

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